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Abstract
According to the intellectual and cultural movement of
transhumanism, human beings are in the early stages of
development, and it encourages theuseofmodern science to
radically enhance physical, intellectual, psychological and
moral capacities. This article offers an overview of trans-
humanism by outlining its historical roots and some current
debates within this movement. This article will further
describe several theological responses to transhumanist
ambitions and predictions about the future. As will be seen in
this article, how one understands ‘salvation’ affects whether
the relationship between Christianity and transhumanism
can be framed in terms of a conflict or cautious friendship.
The article will end by showing the ways in which trans-
humanism itself gives rise to both soteriological and escha-
tological beliefs about human nature and the wider cosmos.
1 | INTRODUCTION
New technological tools offer the possibility of redesigning human nature. Advances made in genetics (most
recently CRISPR‐Cas9), nanotechnology, biotechnology, robotics and so on pose significant challenges to our
received sense of the human condition. Might these advances in technology eventually offer us the possibility of
completely transcending the limitations of human physicality? And, would this be desirable? Transhumanists take an
affirmative stance on these issues. According to the intellectual and cultural movement of transhumanism, human
beings are in the early stages of development, and it encourages the use of modern science to radically enhance
physical, intellectual, psychological and moral capacities. Human nature is, therefore, malleable, and the positive
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message of transhumanism is that technology offers us a chance to remedy nature's unfortunate mistakes.
On some versions of this transhumanist vision, technology promises not only the possibilities of enhancing
human capacities and features. More speculatively, notable thinkers within this movement argue that practical
reason and the further implementation of technology will lead to the emergence of posthumans; beings that are no
longer unambiguously human (Bostrom, 2013). In this posthuman age, ‘humans will no longer be controlled by
nature; instead, they will be the controllers of nature’ (Tirosh‐Samuelson, 2011, p. 20). Technology might ultimately
offer a path to immortality, whereby such posthuman beings exist, post‐biologically, in a digital realm. Indeed, this
idea has in various ways been brought forward as the final telos to human existence. Such notions of cyber‐
immortality (Herzfeld, 2016) raise important issues regarding the theological and religious dimensions to
transhumanist depictions of the integration of humanity within the technological sphere.
This article will provide an overview of contemporary transhumanism, its historical roots, religious responses to
the transhumanist movement, and the ways in which transhumanists express theological concerns regarding the
purpose of humanity. A main argument in this article is that transhumanism not merely gives rise to theological
beliefs and ideas, but that it can and should be considered as an emerging secular religion.
2 | TRANSHUMANISM: THEN AND NOW
Although he did not coin the term transhumanism, Julian Huxley (1887–1975) is frequently singled out as a notable
populariser of it (see Harrison & Wolyniak, 2015). In his 1957 book, New Bottles for New Wine, Huxley outlined his
vision of evolutionary humanism, which suggested the bold vision of humanity transcending itself ‘by realizing new
possibilities of and for his human nature’ (Huxley, 1957, p. 17). Transhumanism, as Huxley considered it, was a ‘new
mental attitude that would usher humanity into a new phase by bridging science and the arts and by using science to
build a better world’ (Tirosh‐Samuelson, 2011, p. 20). In a teleological fashion, Huxley believed that humanity will be
‘consciously fulfilling its real destiny’ by taking charge of the evolutionary process (Huxley, 1957, p. 17). Huxley's
grand vision of the future can in many important ways be considered as a precursor to contemporary transhumanism.
Similar proto‐transhumanist thinking can be found in the writings of the English philosopher and statesman,
Francis Bacon. Bacon, who played a decisive part in the formation of the scientific method, argued in The
Advancement of Human Learning (1605) and Novum Organum (1620) for the need of moving away from the meta-
physical reasoning of the Scholastics and Platonists and towards methodological empiricism (More, 2013, p. 9).
Bacon acknowledged the epistemic costs of human sin. That is, our fall from grace limits, significantly, human
knowledge about the world. The aim of his Novum Organum, in light of the cognitive limitations of human beings,
was to offer a ‘qualitative and organized approach to the acquisition of reliable knowledge about the natural world,
one that relied upon induction rather than tradition’ (Burdett, 2011, p. 21). For Bacon, the new information about
the world should be used in the construction of new technologies, which would help to re‐establish humanity's
rightful place as having dominion over nature. Bacon's utopic vision was further elaborated in his work The New
Atlantis (1626/1915), which offers us a glimpse of a flourishing humanity that has been redeemed through practical
reasoning. For Bacon, technology is not merely a useful tool, it constitutes a significant emancipatory force as it
helps human beings to ‘access the book of Creation’ (Burdett, 2011, p. 24).
Enlightenment thought displays strong tendencies towards the belief in science and technology as forces of
emancipation, particularly in regards to the notion of ‘progress’. Progress, in this new setting, could only be
achieved if the ‘old’ was rejected. In fact, many people took scientific progress to mean emancipation of restrictive
(religious) traditions. As long as external authorities do not interfere, progress is achievable and inevitable. The
view here is that ‘history/society/humanity has advanced, is continuing to advance, and will advance in the future’
(Burdett, 2015, p. 132).
However, as James Hughes has noticed, the transhumanist relation to the enlightenment project is an ambiguous
affair (2010). Reason was a central value for many enlightenment thinkers, and we see a similar emphasis on the utility
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of human reason in relation to scientific and technological progress within transhumanist thinking. At the same time,
transhumanists argue that human reason is rather limited and thatwe need to ‘outsource’ it to the technological realm
by creating artificial general intelligence (Goertzel, 2013). Mark Walker suggests similarly that we need to ‘create
persons who are smarter and more virtuous than we are’ in order to prevent the extinction of human civilization
(Walker, 2011, p. 108). That is, becoming posthuman is our only hope for securing our survival. This idea of overcoming
human nature shares important similarities with Nietzsche's conception of the ‘Overhuman’, and this connection has
attractedmuch attentionwithin researchon transhumanism (Ansell‐Pearson, 1997; Sorgner, 2009; Tuncel, 2017). For
some, Nietzschean thinking can be seen as an important precursor to the development of contemporary trans-
humanism, while others consider the similarities between Ubermensch and the transhumanist conception of the
posthuman to be rather superficial and exaggerated (See Bostrom, 2005, for a negative assessment).
The transhumanist project remains in an antagonistic relationship to external authorities, including religious
traditions. Nevertheless, the Catholic theologian, palaeontologist, and technological optimist, Pierre Teilhard de
Chardin (1881–1955), displayed crypto‐transhumanists beliefs in his depictions of the role of technology in shaping
the future. As Michael Burdett explains, Teilhard's optimistic beliefs about technology are evident in his escha-
tology and displayed in three different ways (Burdett, 2011, p. 29). First, Teilhard predicted that as populations
grow, more people are forced to share an even smaller place, making people more reliant on good infrastructure,
energy sources and food. That is, ‘social unification’ entails further technological development and dependency on
such developments. Second, technology will not be going away, and the world will speed towards further mech-
anization of society. This, for Teilhard, is a natural development, as technology ‘represents the external counterpart
which consciousness relies upon for its own propagation’ (ibid., p. 29). Technology creates the necessary bridge
between human consciousness and the world and enables a more efficient interaction between these two spheres.
Third, Teilhard's belief that the world is in as state of unification and convergence, moving towards an Omega Point,
and the way in which this process results in a Trans‐Human or Ultra‐Human, bears striking similarities to a
transhumanist understanding of technological progress (ibid., p. 31). The notion of ‘Noosphere’, which plays an
essential part of Teilhard's eschatology, suggests that everything ‘immanent in the cosmos is funnelling its energy
toward a single point at the end of history’, whereby the Ultra‐Human person is finally subsumed within Christ
(ibid., pp. 31–32). Although it seems easy to view Teilhard as a proto‐transhumanist, the similarities between
Teilhard's theology and transhumanism should not be overstated, and there remains important differences
between the two regarding death, immortality, embodiment and the ethical ends of humanity (See Grummet, 2011,
in particular, for a critical discussion on these issues). These differences will be elaborated on later in the article.
Contemporary transhumanism includes a number of influential thinkers, who approach the relationship
between technology and the future of humanity from a diverse set of disciplinary perspectives: Nick Bostrom,
Anders Sandberg, Max More, Natasha Vita‐More, Mark Walker, Ray Kurzweil, Hans Moravec, James Hughes,
Aubrey De Grey, Ben Goertzel, Victor Vinge and others. They all agree that technology promises change for human
nature, but there is notable disagreement as to what extent or degree human nature will be altered. Philip Hefner
makes the helpful distinction between, what he dubs, ‘Upper Case Transhumanism’ (UCTH) and ‘Lower Case
Transhumanism’ (LCTH; Hefner, 2009).
In transhumanist discourse, UCTH typically refers to the more hypothetical scenarios, whereby certain future
technological advancements in biotechnology, nanotechnology and genetic engineering, will allow us to transcend
the human condition completely. Machine intelligence has superseded human intelligence, and this greater‐than‐
human‐intelligence drives further the acceleration of technological development beyond human control. This is the
‘Singularity’, which represents the point where ‘our old models must be discarded and a new reality rules’ (Vinge,
2013, p. 366).
UCTH is clearly present in the transhumanist ambition to ‘upload’ human minds; that is, the futurist ambition to
scan a mental state, and the wider neurological network to which it belongs, and copy it onto a digital device.
Anders Sandberg and Nick Bostrom, who prefer to label this scenario Whole Brain Emulation, suggest that the basic
idea of this approach ‘is to take a particular brain, scan its structure in detail and construct a software model of it
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that is so faithful to the original that, when run on appropriate hardware, it will behave in essentially the same way
as the original’ (Sandberg & Bostrom, 2008, p. 7). The successfulness of this proposal rests, of course, on several
technological achievements and steps. First, scanning the brain structure requires ‘high‐throughput microscopy
with sufficient resolution’ that can capture the relevant physico‐mental properties. Second, the raw data captured
through a brain scan needs to be adequately interpreted and translated into a three‐dimensional model. Third, we
need to develop a hardware powerful enough to run a simulation based on the acquired and interpreted data
(Bostrom, 2014, pp. 36–37). This ambition is a clear manifestation of the transhumanist hope of completely
transcending the human condition, of being fully liberated from our animal nature and the limitations of our bio-
logical makeup.
LCTH focuses on enhancing human nature and adopts a softer tone compared to the more speculative voices of
UCTH. As Hefner explains, this makes LCTH much more difficult to deal with, and it is more challenging to assess the
consequences of this perspective for the larger question about what it means to be human. The author and biomedical
gerontologist Aubrey De Grey has in various books, articles and reports argued for the possibility of altering and
significantly delaying the ageing processes of the human body. De Grey, while he does not endorse the strong notion
of physical immortality of UCTH, believes that modern technology might offer us ways to extend the human lifespan
beyond its current natural limit. De Grey's main ambition is to develop ‘rejuvenation biotechnologies’, new bio-
medicines and biomedical therapies that can repair cellular damage caused by our biological ageing processes (De
Grey, 2007). The hope is that such technologies can effectively repair various age‐related damages to the human body
in order to maintain a state of negligible senescence, thus delaying the damaging effects of ageing.
LCTH proceeds on the assumptions that (a) it is good to enhance human physical and mental capacities and
override any undesirable traits by utilizing various therapies, and (b) our current biological makeup is not our
destiny, but we are free—and perhaps even obliged—to enhance our nature. We can and should improve what
nature has bestowed upon us, and this entails not merely fixing something that is wrong (therapy) but designing our
human nature in a manner in accordance with our ideals (enhancing).
Whilst different in scope, proponents of UCTH and LCTH adopt similar strategies for justifying changing human
physicality through modern technology. For example, both camps often stress the arbitrariness of drawing a line
between therapy and enhancement. This ‘line‐drawing objection’ (Murray, 2007) states that it is impossible to draw a
strict line between therapy and enhancement given that curing S of some disease entails enhancing the life
experience of S. Another argument, frequently employed within UCTH and LCTH, is that we are inevitably speeding
towards a world in which it is no longer possible to ontologically distinguish between the realms of humanity and
technology. On this ‘resistance is futile argument’, it is too late to rewind the clock of technological progress, and so
we have no choice but to embrace our posthuman future. The clear boundary between humanity and the sphere of
the technological has already been shattered.
2.1 | Theological responses to transhumanism: Conflict and cautious friendship
Whether the relationship between Christianity and transhumanism is one of conflict or cautious friendship depends
on how ‘salvation’ is defined. Both movements offer a soteriological vision of some sort, but what it means to be
saved varies and is constantly being negotiated in the Christianity–transhumanism dialogue. Because ‘salvation’ is
not a stable concept, the relationship between Christianity and transhumanism can be imagined in a number of
different ways, as will be explored in this section.
Many scholars have seen transhumanism as standing in an antagonistic relationship to religious traditions.
Similarly, many religious scholars have voiced concerns about the metaphysical assumptions and aims of the
transhumanist movement. Brent Waters suggests that transhumanism offers radically different soteriological and
eschatological answers compared to Christianity, and that the ‘convictions underlying transhumanism are both
inadequate and dangerous’ (Waters, 2011, p. 164). For transhumanism, as we have seen, embodiment ‘is the
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principal problem of the human condition’ (ibid.). The body is a prison, which imposes upon us severe physical and
cognitive limitations. Not only does it limit us in particular ways, it also causes suffering and pain. The soteriological
message of transhumanism, therefore, is that we need to be saved from our limited and fragile biological prisons.
Hence, the transhumanist strategy is to develop such technologies that allow us to remedy the immediate problems
associated with being biological creatures and ultimately escape our embodied condition. Waters points to the
Manichean influence on transhumanism, according to which the material body is intrinsically evil and from which
the soul must escape. Likewise, transhumanism gives way to a Pelagian notion of human beings achieving perfection
by will. As transhumanists pursue a condition of disembodiment, its portrayal of the human person collides with
those theologies that emphasize the importance of creatureliness and a shared nature across all humankind. As
Celia Deane‐Drummond remarks, ‘The idea of solidarity prominent in Roman Catholic social teaching, based on a
shared human condition, is no longer tenable in a transhumanist world, for the human itself is now being trans-
formed away from its roots in shared creaturely being’ (Deane‐Drummond, 2011, p. 124).
According to many of its critics, transhumanism falls to the temptation to play God. Although often not spelt
out, the ‘playing God objection’ involves according to Ted Peters three overlapping meanings. First, it can mean that
we are trying to learn ‘God's awesome secrets’ (Peters, 2003, p. 11), and by learning such secrets we acquire God‐like
powers—powers that no human being should have. A second meaning is that human beings, when successfully
wielding the power of technology, gains ‘power over life and death’ (ibid.). The assumption, here, is that such power
should only belong to God. A third meaning, which is particularly relevant to the research on transhumanism, is that
the use of practical reason, science and especially technology gives humanity the powerful ability to ‘alter life and
influence human evolution’ (ibid.). This is not an objection as such, but it connects with a larger concern about
transhumanism, namely that it significantly overstates what humanity can achieve through modern technology. A
transhumanist epistemology is hubris in disguise, meaning that we ‘overreach ourselves and transgress divinely
imposed limits’ (ibid., p. 12). A robust theological position requires ‘an honest recognition of human sinfulness. At
any time and in any place, otherwise happy and fulfilled human beings may initiate evil and destruction’ (Peters,
2011, p. 170). In failing in this respect, transhumanism stands in further tension with the Christian conviction that
human history remains under divine judgement.
Transhumanism is frequently critiqued on theological grounds. Nevertheless, some have argued for a less
antagonistic relationship between transhumanism and Christian theology, suggesting that theologians can embrace
parts or aspects of transhumanism. Ronald Cole‐Turner, for example, has argued for a limited adoption of trans-
humanism from a Christian perspective on, seemingly, two different lines of reasoning. Contrary to some scholars,
Cole‐Turner traces the source of transhumanism back to Christianity itself and more specifically to the Western
notion of divinization and the Eastern notion of theosis. These theological ideals promise us an ascension towards
God, a gradual participation in the very being of the divine reality through spiritual transformation. Such doctrinal
statements are the real roots of transhumanist thinking, argues Cole‐Turner, thus suggesting that as ‘trans-
humanism is authentically and essentially Christian’, one can embrace the transhumanist vision on a theological
basis (Cole‐Turner, 2015, p. 151; For more discussions on theosis/divinization/deification as it pertains to trans-
humanism, see Cole‐Turner, 2018; Walker, 2018). Cole‐Turner's second reason for his compatibility‐thesis con-
nects with broader soteriological and eschatological claims regarding God's ongoing renewal and transformation of
the cosmos. Drawing on the theology of Karl Rahner, Cole‐Turner affirms the idea of God acting through evolu-
tionary categories and the possibility of cosmic self‐transcendence, which resulted in the emergence of humanity.
Cole‐Turner interprets this idea to support the transhumanist goal of technological self‐transcendence through
modern technology. God works through technology, and this is consonant with the reliance of transhumanism upon
technology for transforming humanity. Technology allows us to participate in God's transformation of this world.
We can see how Mark Walker affirms this when he writes that he advocates using ‘genetic engineering to enhance
our biological capacity for virtuous living, for becoming godlike, for deification’ (Walker, 2018, p. 252) Not all forms
of playing God are wrong, and we should instead celebrate that God has, through the gift of technology, ‘made it
possible for us to take steps to become more godlike, even divine’ (ibid.).
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In Philip Hefner's terminology, we are ‘created co‐creators’. Coined in his much‐influential book The Human
Factor (1993), the concept of ‘created co‐creator’ seeks to outline what it means to be created in the image of God.
We are created beings, and God is the ground of our existence, but we are also free beings that exercise a
significant degree of freedom in relation to God. We are, therefore, in a qualified sense of the term creators, such
that our activities contribute to the unfolding of the cosmos. However, our actions participate and cooperate with
the divine agency. This idea allows Hefner to cash out the important theological conclusion that human beings, as
created co‐creators, are called to contribute to creation's unfolding, including the ongoing development of the
technological sphere (Hefner, 2009). Hefner's framework is, unsurprisingly, frequently utilised in the trialogue
between theology, ethics, and technology, and it has been emphasised as a particularly useful model for enabling a
more constructive theological engagement with transhumanism (Garner, 2015). It even allows for a cautious
friendship between the two.
One could argue, on this more permissive response, that enhancement technologies are acceptable as long as
they do not undermine those properties or characteristics that are essential to human nature. From a Catholic
standpoint, Brian Patrick Green has argued that natural law ethics is partly compatible with the ambition to change
human nature. Drawing on Aquinas's distinction between first (biological) nature and second (cultural) nature,
Patrick Green makes the argument that, as our cultural nature has already been affected by technology, and our
cultural nature is ontologically tied to our biological nature, the ongoing technologization of the world has affected
our biological constitution as well—medicine being a clear example. Technology has extended the scope of human
power and agency, and ‘if action follows being, and human action has changed, then our being may have changed as
well’ (Patrick Green, 2015, p. 205). Human nature is already changed. This situation can be deemed acceptable if
one subscribes to the rationalist school of thought within natural law tradition, which considers ‘the morally
relevant aspect of human nature to be mental’ (ibid., p. 208). So long as a transhuman/posthuman retains its rational
mental faculties, this scenario does not pose a problem to Catholic natural law teaching. A similar conclusion has
been offered by Benedikt Paul Göcke, who recently argued that ‘moderate transhumanism’ is acceptable to
Christian theology, if an enhancement does not ‘conflict with the character of human beings as free and autono-
mous moral agents’ (2017, p. 352). The frameworks of Green and Göcke point towards the possibility of a cautious
friendship between the movement of transhumanism and that of Christian theology.
3 | THE RELIGIOUS IMPULSE OF TRANSHUMANISM
Transhumanists view religious authority with suspicion, and they consider such external voices to be obstacles to
technological progress. As I outlined earlier, transhumanist thinking is very much rooted in the metaphysical and
epistemological frameworks of the enlightenment project, especially in virtue of its commitment to the ‘myth of
progress’ narrative. Although many transhumanists take their worldview to be in opposition to religious outlooks
on life, transhumanism itself displays a remarkably strong religious impulse. Anders Sandberg has helpfully
outlined several ways in which transhumanism engages with the larger issue of the meaning of existence.
Although the majority of transhumanists self‐identify as ‘secular’ (Hughes, 2008), Sandberg shows how the
broader issue of meaning comes to the surface within three different forms of transhumanism. Within individual
transhumanism, meaning is related to the possibility of living a life ‘by enhancements so as to achieve better
health and mental capacity, refined emotions, new abilities, and longevity and perhaps become a posthuman’
(Sandberg, 2015, p. 4). Such an enhanced condition allows one to engage with new realms of value, inaccessible
to non‐enhanced people. Terrestrial transhumanism proceeds from a more communal standpoint and urges us to
develop the necessary technologies in order to usher humanity into a posthuman era, ’liberated from the con-
straints imposed by natural evolution’ (ibid., p. 9). Cosmist transhumanism applies this techno‐progressive vision
on the universe as a whole, arguing for the technologization of the entire cosmos by converting matter into mind.
On one possible scenario, outlined by Kurzweil, the universe becomes intelligent and ‘wakes up’ (Kurzweil, 2005;
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Sandberg, 2015, p. 14). In other words, our cosmos is moving towards the realization and emergence of God
(Kurzweil, 2002, p. 53).
Albeit conceptualised in different ways, these forms of transhumanism construe meaning as achievable ‘en-
gineering targets’ (Sandberg, 2015, p. 4). Far from rejecting the pursuit for meaning, transhumanism brings it into
the realm of technological development. Transhumanism displays strongly religious elements. Indeed, one can
locate within this techno‐optimist view both a soteriology and eschatology. Several transhumanists posit digital
immortality as the soteriological goal of technological development and as the very telos of human existence.
I suggested earlier that the body is portrayed as a prison within transhumanist/posthumanist discourse, from which
humanity needs to be liberated. Our biological condition is a mere accident of history and not an inevitability of this
world. As Hava Tirosh‐Samuelson explains, ‘Through technology humans will presumably be able to achieve what
traditional religions have sought for millennia: immortality’ (Tirosh‐Samuelson, 2012, p. 715). Technology gives us
what established religion never could. Ray Kurzweil is explicit about the teleological dimension to a transhumanist
anthropology when he suggests the following: ‘I regard the freeing of the human mind from its severe physical
limitations of scope and duration as the necessary step in evolution. Evolution, in my view, represents the purpose
of life. That is, the purpose of life—and of our lives—is to evolve’ (Kurzweil, 2002, p. 53). As some scholars have
noted, this picture of bodily emancipation entails an ontological dualism by identifying our personhood with
transferable digital information, which is taken as ontologically distinct from pure matter (Herzfeld, 2016).
Cybernetic immortality is by many considered as the soteriological goal of transhumanism and quite possibly
the endpoint of our evolutionary development. In this way, transhumanism posits a distinctively secular eschatology.
Tirosh‐Samuelson observes that transhumanism shares with traditional religion an ‘eschatological impulse, even
though transhumanism speculates about the eschatological end of the world as a goal that can be accomplished by
human efforts alone rather than with divine intervention’ (Tirosh‐Samuelson, 2012, p. 721). A main difference, then,
between a transhumanist eschatology and that of, for example, Christianity pertains to methods of transcendence
(See Hopkins, 2005).
Transhumanism, some have argued, does not merely overlap with broadly speaking religious interests. It can be
considered as a religion in virtue of some of its claims regarding the ultimate purpose of the world and human
nature, but also in the way that transhumanism is functionally similar to religious traditions by ‘providing a vision of
something greater than the present condition’, as well as a sense of belonging through a community united by such
a vision (Jordan, 2006, p. 58). Moreover, while transhumanism does not possess or entail any formal rituals, it ‘could
be said to possess symbolic representation of shared meaning in the form of transhumanist art, which includes
symbols, vocabulary, images, songs, films and science‐fiction literature’ (ibid., p. 59). Transhumanism provides a
story about our ‘sacred history’ of not only our origin, but in terms of our destiny as well.
4 | A SUMMARY
This article has explored the cultural and intellectual movement of transhumanism, focusing particularly on the
history of transhumanist thinking, the diversity of opinions among transhumanist proponents and the ways in which
theologians have engaged transhumanism. Although many theologians critique the ontological underpinnings of
transhumanism, others have explored the possibility of a cautious friendship between Christian theology and
transhumanist thinking, suggesting that the two have overlapping soteriological concerns. Many transhumanists
take their worldview to be in direct opposition to a religious outlook on life, yet it was seen that transhumanism
brings the pursuit of meaning into the sphere of technology. Indeed, it seems as if transhumanism gives rise to both
a soteriological conception of human nature and an eschatological prediction about physical reality.
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